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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CaseNo.20050072-CA
Priority No. 2

CALVIN MOORE,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Calvin Moore relies on his opening brief and also refers this
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the standard of review, the
case, and the facts. Mr. Moore otherwise responds to the State's answer to his opening
brief on the jury instruction issue as follows. (The jury instruction issue is Point V in Mr.
Moore's Opening Brief and Point III in the State's Brief.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Moore maintains his previously stated arguments in his opening brief.
In this reply brief, he addresses the issue concerning whether the jury was improperly
instructed on both aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. In sum, the confusing and
conflicting jury instructions defined aggravated assault in a manner which allowed the
jury to improperly convict him of both the greater offense (aggravated burglary) and the
lesser included offense (aggravated assault).

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE CONFUSING AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
INSTRUCTIONS IMPROPERLY ALLOWED A CONVICTION FOR A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
The State claims that because trial counsel agreed to the jury instructions, the
instructions may not be raised under the theory of invited error. See Appellee's Brief,
page 23 (citing State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16). While case law apparently supports
its invited error argument, the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) still
allows this Court to review the jury instruction issue. Invited error is a basis different
than IAC and the State does not contend otherwise.
The gravamen of the State's argument is that "jurors convicted defendant of
second degree aggravated assault because he 'intentionally causefd] serious bodily injury
to another' - e.g., Marcus Anderson. See Jury Instruction 32, R. 291[.]" Appellee's Brief,
page 26 (footnote omitted). The State relies on the above language from Jury Instruction
32 to argue that "[t]his element is not necessary to defendant's aggravated burglary
conviction." Appellee's Brief, page 26; cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b)(^/rJ
degree Aggravated Assault requires use of "a dangerous weapon ... or other means of
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury").
Under the State's argument and its reading of State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah
1985), it claims the Aggravated Assault element of "uses a dangerous weapon... or other
means of force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury" is inapplicable to Mr.
Moore's case because the jury would have had no occasion to consider such language.
2

In contrast to the State's claim, however, the plain language of the jury instructions
demand otherwise. Mr. Moore's jury was in fact instructed on the Aggravated Assault
definition that contained the alleged inapplicable language. Jury Instruction 31 expressly
defined Aggravated Assault as follows:
A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits assault and
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.
Jury Instruction 31, R 290 (emphasis added) (attached hereto as Addendum 2).
Since Jury Instruction 31 told the jury that the underscored language constituted
Aggravated Assault, R 290, and Jury Instruction 26 similarly allowed such language to
provide the basis for Aggravated Burglary, R 285, Addendum 2, once the jury convicted
Moore of the greater charge they may have similarly believed that Aggravated Assault
was simultaneously established. Accordingly, the Bradley analysis applies and the lesser
included offense should be vacated. State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985). Trial
counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the instructions.
In Mr. Moore's case, Aggravated Assault was inadequately defined for the jury.
"The parties are 'entitled to ... a presentation of the case to the jury under instructions that
clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues and the law applicable thereto so that the
jury will understand its duties." Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 274-75
(Utah 1992) (explaining that trial court's failure to simplify and clarify jury instructions

3

resulted in confusing instructions that "may well have prejudiced [appellant's]... case.");
Pollack v. State, 2002 FL 2264 (Fla. App. 2002) ("An instruction which tends to confuse
rather than enlighten the jury is cause for reversal if it may have misled the jury and
caused them to arrive at a conclusion that otherwise they would not have reached.").
Jury Instruction 31 defined Aggravated Assault in a manner which allowed the
jurors to convict Mr. Moore of both the greater and the lesser included offense, R. 290,
Addendum 2, while Jury Instruction 26 and 32 defined Aggravated Assault under a
different alternative theory. R 285, 291, Addendum. Instructions 26, 31 and 32 conflict
with one another.
For no error to occur, the definition of Aggravated Assault under Jury Instruction
31 would have had to be rendered superfluous by the jury (or this Court). But such a
result is precluded under the well-established rule that jury instructions must be construed
as a whole. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1146 (Utah 1989). The jury is not
allowed to ignore one instruction in favor of another. See R 262 (Jury Instruction 3).
Moreover, "[njothing in these specific sentences or in the charge as a whole makes
clear to the jury that one of these contradictory instructions carries more weight than the
other. Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm
instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing court has no way of
knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their
verdict. Francis v. Franklin, All U.S. 307, 322 (1985).
"It is not sufficient for the jury instruction merely to be susceptible to an
4

interpretation that is technically correct. The important question is whether there is a
'reasonable likelihood' that the jury was misled or confused by the instruction, and
therefore applied it in a way that violated the Constitution. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S.
1 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Cage v.
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39,41(1990) ("In construing the instruction, we consider how
reasonable jurors could have understood the charge as a whole.").
Trial counsel was ineffective. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 1f 20, 94 P.3d 211. His
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and but for counsel's
failure to object to the instruction the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id.;
Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Moore respectfully requests that his convictions
be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. In the alternative, he
asks this Court to vacate the lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault.
DATED this %

day of May, 2006.

Ronalq Fujino
Attorney for Mr. Moore
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (l)(b) Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
Amended by Chapter 291,1995 General Session

ADDENDUM 2

INSTRUCTION NO.

3(

A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits assault and
..in or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force likeh
serious bodily injury.

» produce death or

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

^

Before you can convict the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, of the offense of Aggravated
Burglary as charged in count I of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the 5th day of February, 2003, in Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, entered or remained in the dwelling of Marcus
Anderson and Antionette Ragsdale; and
2.

That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and

3.

That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and

4.

That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit an assault on

any person; and
5.

That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant or

another participant in the crime either:
(a)

caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in the

crime; or
(b)

used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon
against any person who is not a participant in the crime.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of the information. If, on
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I.

INSTRUCTION NO.
I*;lOi.

'*'

32
N

*

i

Assault, as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.

'.

f

Utah, the defendant, Calvin Leroy Moore, assaulted Marcus Anderson; and
2.

That the said defendant intentionally or knowingly assaulted Marcus Anderson;

3.

That the said defendant then and there intentionally caused serious bodily injury

and

toft lai • : i :i s \ ndi : s • : > i:

• '

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
ti ni ith : i sach and

' * "ie foregoing elements beyond a reasonable d

rt the

find the defendant guilw o; Aggravated Assault as charged in count ii r-\ Jie information. .

t
i

the oti-jr hand. >n. - ••- i ^* convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
forego;.kL c

' •

ist fin ::! the defendant :i
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